Justice and Public Health by Persad, Govind
 1 
Abstract: This chapter discusses how justice applies to public health. It begins by outlining three 
different metrics employed in discussions of justice: resources, capabilities, and welfare. It then 
discusses different accounts of justice in distribution, reviewing utilitarianism, egalitarianism, 
prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism, as well as desert-based theories, and applies these 
distributive approaches to public health examples. Next, it examines the interplay between 
distributive justice and individual rights, such as religious rights, property rights, and rights 
against discrimination, by discussing examples including mandatory treatment and screening. 
The chapter also examines the nexus between public health and debates concerning whose 
interests matter to justice (the “scope of justice”), including global justice, intergenerational 
justice, and environmental justice, as well as debates concerning whether justice applies to 
individual choices or only to institutional structures (the “site of justice”). The chapter closes 
with a discussion of strategies, including deliberative and aggregative democracy, for 
adjudicating disagreements about justice.  
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JUSTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Public health is concerned with the health of entire populations and societies. Questions 
about how our societies ought to be shaped by choices, in public health and elsewhere, are the 
subject matter of justice. To see how justice intersects with public health, imagine an 
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international public health researcher—we’ll call her Julie—examining a World Health 
Organization chart of life expectancy in South America (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Life Expectancy at Birth: South America 
 
 
As Julie examines the chart, she sees that life expectancy is over 80 in Chile, but under 70 in 
Bolivia and Guyana. These facts present two questions at the heart of justice: first, what are the 
criteria for a good society; and, second, what differences in what people enjoy within and 
between societies are acceptable?  
At lunch, Julie tells her colleagues about the chart, while they tell her about their public 
health projects, which include water quality, vaccinations, urban planning, and taxation and 
 3 
economic policy. Their discussion presents a third question at the interface of justice and public 
health: which public health interventions will make for a better society? This question has both 
an empirical component, concerning what outcomes public health interventions will produce, 
and a normative component, concerning which outcomes are worth seeking. Julie and her 
colleagues also discuss organizational priorities. Some advocate funding interventions that are 
already recognized as cost-effective. Others argue for funding new interventions that promise to 
narrow gaps in life expectancy. Still others worry that some of the interventions, such as changes 
in urban design or taxes on unhealthy foods, would unfairly burden some individuals or groups. 
Although these discussions may never explicitly use the word “justice,” they involve the sorts of 
questions examined in the remainder of this chapter. 
WHAT SHOULD WE MEASURE? METRICS OF JUSTICE 
 
Metrics are methodologies for quantifying and evaluating the contribution of various 
interventions, including public health interventions, to the achievement of a just society. The 
three most prominent metrics are those that focus, respectively, on resources, capabilities, and 
welfare (Daniels 1990).  
 
Resources 
 
Resourcist metrics judge the justice of a society by looking at how it distributes 
resources. John Rawls (1999) proposes a primary goods approach, which has become a 
prominent resourcist metric. Rawls defines primary goods to include income and wealth, as well 
as less tangible goods such as rights and social bases of self-respect. 
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 Resourcist metrics make data collection easy and avoid judgments about what a good life 
is. Some people worry, however, that resourcist metrics are unfair to disabled or ill individuals 
who require more resources than others in order to pursue their goals or participate in society 
(Sen, 1985). Familiar resource metrics for public health audiences include gross domestic 
product (GDP) and per-capita GDP, which measure a society’s total and average economic 
resources. 
 
Capabilities 
 
Capability metrics, pioneered by Amartya Sen (1985) and Martha Nussbaum (2000), look 
at the distribution of capabilities, which are freedoms to engage in various activities. Nussbaum 
(2003) lists ten capabilities with universal importance—life; bodily health, bodily integrity; 
senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; interaction with other 
species; play; and control over one’s environment—whereas Sen (2004) suggests that the list of 
capabilities can differ between societies and be developed through public discussion. 
Capability metrics emphasize active dimensions of human life, such as choice and 
agency, rather than focusing on passive enjoyment or resource possession. However, critics 
worry that they underrate the importance of actual outcomes (Arneson, 2010), and that 
measuring and comparing capabilities will be difficult and intrusive (Freeman, 2006). In light of 
the former concern, Ruth Faden and Madison Powers (2006) have developed a metric that draws 
on the capability approach but focuses on actual functionings—the activities individuals engage 
in—rather than capabilities, and have applied that metric to public health. The Human 
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Development Index, which combines life expectancy, literacy, and income measures, also builds 
on ideas from the capability approach and is widely used in public health (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). 
 
Welfare 
 
Welfarist accounts assess justice by examining the distribution of welfare. Some welfarist 
accounts define welfare as a subjective mental state of pleasure; others define it as preference 
satisfaction; and still others define it using a list of objectively valuable experiences (Parfit, 
1984, appx. I). All of these approaches face problems, which include concerns about repugnant, 
expensive, and self-sacrificing preferences as well as concerns that subjective mental states 
matter far less than the arrangement of external reality (Faden and Powers, 2006; Nozick, 1974). 
Prominent welfarists include Jeremy Bentham (1789) and Peter Singer (1979), as well as many 
economists. Welfarist public health metrics include quality-adjusted and disability-adjusted life-
years (QALYs and DALYs), which are typically generated via surveys of individuals’ subjective 
experience of different health setbacks (Gold, 2002). 
 
Some public health interventions are similarly attractive regardless of what metric is 
used. As an example, clean water is likely to improve the resources, capabilities, and welfare of 
its recipients. For other interventions, however, choices about metrics matter greatly: alcohol 
taxes appear less attractive under some welfare-based metrics, which assign weight to drinkers’ 
subjective pleasure, than capability or resource metrics, which assign such pleasure little or no 
weight. 
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WHO SHOULD GET WHAT? PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
Along with what to measure, we must also consider how to distribute whatever is 
measured. Non-correlative principles do not try to correlate how much each individual receives 
with other facts about that individual, whereas correlative principles do. 
 
Non-correlative principles 
 
Maximization 
 
This principle maximizes what is available irrespective of distribution. In Julie’s 
example, maximization would favor improving life expectancy by five years in longer-lived 
Chile over improving it by four years for an equally sized group of individuals in shorter-lived 
Bolivia. Maximization is often described as “utilitarianism,” though that term is more frequently 
used to refer specifically to welfare maximization, as opposed to capability or resource 
maximization. A frequently discussed basis for public health decisions is maximizing the number 
of QALYs saved or DALYs avoided (Schwappach, 2003). 
Maximization becomes more complicated when public health interventions that change 
the size of the population, such as family planning, are at issue. Applying a maximization 
approach to interventions that change population size presents a choice between total and 
average maximization. Maximizing the average favors a smaller population with a lower sum of 
whatever is valuable but in which the average individual is better off, whereas maximizing the 
total favors the opposite. Each view faces problems: the average view is criticized for its 
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unwillingness to add individuals who enjoy a substantial amount of whatever is valuable to a 
very well-off population when adding these people would fail to maximize the average, while the 
total view is criticized for its favorability to policies that produce vast populations who each 
enjoy little of what is valuable (Parfit, 1984). In an effort to address these concerns, some have 
attempted to combine elements of both total and average maximization, though no solution 
appears completely satisfactory (Arrhenius, Ryberg, and Tannsjö, 2010). 
 
Prioritarianism: priority to the worst off 
 
Prioritarian approaches assign special importance to helping those at the bottom of a 
distribution. Strict prioritarian views, such as Rawls’s “difference principle” (1999, 67-73), give 
absolute priority to the worst off group, while flexible prioritarian views employ a sliding scale 
of priority on which priority increases as individuals become worse off (Parfit, 1997, 213). 
Prioritarian distributive principles have support among health care planners (Ottersen, Mbilinyi, 
Mæstad, and Norheim, 2008). Incorporating distributional weights into cost-effectiveness 
analysis, by assigning more importance to QALY increases that go to individuals who are worse 
off, represents one way of quantifying prioritarian ideas in public health (Ottersen, Mæstad, and 
Norheim, 2014). 
In the WHO example, a flexible prioritarian view might favor a 5-year improvement in 
Guyanese life expectancy over a 6-year improvement in Brazil, but not over a 10-year-
improvement in Brazil. In contrast, a strict prioritarian view will always favor even a miniscule 
improvement for the worst-off over an enormous one for the better-off. This has prompted 
criticism of the strict prioritarian view (Arrow, 1973). 
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Egalitarianism 
 
Egalitarianism aims to reduce inequalities in distribution. In Julie’s example, 
egalitarianism would agree with prioritarianism that we should give extra weight to improving 
life expectancy in shorter-lived countries. Strict egalitarianism aims to achieve complete 
equality, while looser approaches to egalitarianism propose what Elizabeth Anderson (2008) 
calls “range-constraining rules” that limit the extent of inequality. Many familiar measures of 
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient (which quantifies the extent to which people’s incomes 
differ), are employed in public health (Wagstaff, Paci, and Van Doorslaer, 1991).  
Though egalitarian and prioritarian approaches frequently make the same 
recommendations, prioritarians focus on the absolute position of the worst off, while egalitarians 
focus on the gap between the worst-off and better off. Therefore, egalitarians—unlike 
prioritarians—will sometimes advocate “leveling down”: that is, they will sometimes object to 
an improvement that helps the worst off but increases inequality. Leveling down has been 
criticized by prioritarians (Parfit, 1997), but defended by some egalitarians (Eyal, 2013). 
 
Sufficientarianism 
 
Sufficientarianism ensures that no one falls below a specified threshold (Shields, 2012). 
Some define thresholds in absolute terms, while others argue that thresholds of sufficiency must 
vary with social context (Faden and Powers, 2006). The use of poverty thresholds, such as the 
$1/day threshold employed in the Millennium Development Goals (Deaton, 2003), represents the 
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most prominent effort to operationalize a sufficientarian view in a domain relevant to public 
health. Some human rights documents also define the right to health as a right to adequate or 
sufficient health (Persad, 2014, 603-04). 
As an example, applying a life expectancy threshold at 72 years of age to the WHO chart 
would support public health interventions that increase life expectancy in Bolivia and Guyana, 
which have life expectancies under 72, but would be neutral between interventions in Paraguay 
and in Chile, even though Paraguayans live less long on average than Chileans. 
Sufficientarianism, like prioritarianism, helps those worse off while avoiding levelling down. 
Sufficientarianism has been criticized, however, for ignoring morally relevant differences above 
or below the selected thresholds (Shields, 2012). Even if improving life expectancy for people in 
Bolivia and Guyana should be the highest priority, the fact that Paraguayans live less long than 
Chileans is not obviously irrelevant. 
 
Correlative principles 
 
Correlative principles aim to correlate what people receive with some other dimension of 
life in which they differ. Three of the most prominent correlative principles correlate what 
people receive to, respectively, their contribution, their effort, and what they have traditionally 
received. 
 
Contribution 
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Some theorists have argued that individuals who increase the amount available to be 
distributed ought to receive more of what is distributed (Miller, 1990, ch. 6). As an example, past 
organ donors might receive priority for organ transplants in the future (Persad, Wertheimer, and 
Emanuel, 2009). Even though contribution-based principles will often reach similar conclusions 
to the non-correlative maximization principle discussed earlier, contribution-based principles 
look to past contributions, while maximization looks to future contributions.  
Applied to the WHO chart, a contribution-based approach might favor public health 
efforts that improve life expectancy in Argentina, because the Argentinian economy contributes 
more to global productivity, over efforts to improve life expectancy in less developed Guyana. In 
light of the foundational importance of health to people’s lives, however, contribution is 
arguably an inappropriate basis for distributing health, even if it can be an appropriate basis for 
distributing other goods (Feiring, 2008). 
 
Effort  
 
Others argue that the distribution of goods should be based on individual effort, with 
those who put in more effort receiving more. One prominent version of this view is advanced by 
John Roemer (1993), who argues that we should ensure that people who exercise a “comparable 
degree of responsibility” do equally well, regardless of their background circumstances. Roemer 
also proposes a detailed methodology for quantifying effort, though this methodology has not 
been widely adopted in public health.  
As with contribution, there is a worry that an effort-based distribution of health will be 
unjustly harsh on those who exert little effort (Feiring, 2008). Explaining which kinds of effort 
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should count is also challenging: for instance, even if inefficient farming techniques in Suriname 
mean that Surinamese farmers exert more effort to produce a given quantity of food than 
Colombian farmers, rewarding effort that stems from inefficient practices seems like a dubious 
basis for distributing benefits, including public health benefits. Ultimately, as Susan Hurley 
(2002) observes, identifying which types of effort matter for distribution seems to require some 
background account of justice. Once this account has been identified, it is unclear why effort 
itself matters. 
 
Tradition 
 
A traditionalist view correlates what individuals receive with what they have historically 
and traditionally received. Applied to Julie’s chart, a traditionalist view would attempt to 
maintain the distribution of life expectancy over time, and so would oppose any proposal that 
dramatically increases or decreases life expectancy. 
Because of their opposition to change and tendency to maintain hierarchy, traditionalist 
views are often identified with political conservatism and a bias toward the status quo (Brennan 
and Hamlin, 2004). Such views have also been defended by thinkers, such as Bentham (1843) 
and David Hume (1739) on the basis of individuals’ psychological attachment to accustomed 
arrangements. In practice, traditionalism frequently obstructs public health innovations that 
might improve the lives of some but disrupt the lives of others. For instance, some assert that 
single-payer health insurance will be difficult to enact in the United States because it would 
disrupt insurance arrangements to which many have become accustomed (Feder, 2014). 
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Combining principles 
 
Any distributive principle can be paired with any metric (Table 1). For instance, while 
Rawls pairs a resourcist metric with a distributive approach that favors the worst off, it is also 
possible—as he himself notes—to combine a resourcist metric with a distributive approach that 
simply maximizes total resources without any special concern for the worst-off (Rawls, 1999, 
277-85). 
Some approaches to distributive justice employ only a single distributive principle, while 
others include multiple principles, which are weighed against one another. Defenders of multi-
principle approaches argue that no single principle adequately captures what is needed for a just 
society (Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel, 2009). However, some worry that multi-principle 
approaches fail to articulate a principled basis for balancing different principles, such as equality 
and maximization, against one another (Rawls, 1999, 34-40). 
 
Table 1: Metrics and Principles of Distributive Justice 
Metrics Distributive Principles Prominent Approaches 
(a)  Resources Non-correlative Rawlsian: (a) + (2) 
(b)  Capabilities 1)   Maximization Utilitarian: (c) + (1) 
(c)  Welfare 2)   Prioritarianism Faden and Powers: modified (b) + (4) 
 3)   Egalitarianism  
 4)   Sufficientarianism  
 Correlative  
 5)   Contribution  
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 6)   Effort  
 7)   Tradition  
 
 
WHAT ELSE MATTERS? INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND CONSTRAINTS ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
Most accounts of justice recognize certain non-distributive constraints on the pursuit of 
distributive principles. Rawls (1999), for instance, believes that certain basic liberties, such as 
freedom of thought and association, political participation, freedom of movement, and the right 
to hold personal property, must be secured before we begin thinking about the just distribution of 
resources.  
Many public health dilemmas involve conflicts between distributive goals and 
individuals’ basic rights or liberties. Many of these basic rights take the form of negative rights, 
which are rights against intervention. For instance, rights to bodily integrity, freedom of 
association, or freedom of religion might complicate efforts to require vaccinations against a 
communicable disease or quarantine individuals who show signs of infection, even when these 
public health interventions would improve population health or achieve a better distribution of 
health. Some libertarian theories (e.g. Nozick, 1974) regard property rights as absolute and 
prohibit the imposition of taxes, which would have the effect of choking off funding for public 
health interventions.  
Meanwhile, basic positive rights, which are rights to receive benefits, can also obstruct 
public health goals: for instance, recognizing an individual right to lifesaving health care can 
consume resources that would otherwise be used to promote public health (Persad 2014; 
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Schmidt, Gostin, and Emanuel, 2015). Other types of rights, such as rights against differential 
treatment on the basis of race or gender, can also come into conflict with public health initiatives 
such as targeted screening of poor women of color for HIV infection (Faden and Powers, 2006, 
vii-viii) or restrictions on the purchase of unhealthy foods (Kass, Hecht, Paul, and Birnbach, 
2014; Barnhill, 2015). 
Accounts of justice differ not only in the list of rights they recognize but also in how they 
handle conflicts between, on the one hand, distributive aims, such as sufficiency or priority to the 
worst off, and, on the other hand, basic rights and liberties, such as freedom of association or 
property rights. Some accounts, like Rawls’s, give fundamental liberties absolute priority over 
distributive aims. Others allow rights to be overridden when doing so can dramatically improve 
distributive outcomes.  
WHERE DOES JUSTICE APPLY? GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE SCOPE OF JUSTICE 
 
Some accounts of justice give equal weight to all interests that are affected by a given 
decision. But many others give special weight to some interests. Deciding which interests matter 
is the question of the scope of justice. 
The most prominent debates have involved geographical scope, which separates theories 
of justice that give special weight to one’s fellow citizens from those that do not. The latter are 
often termed “cosmopolitan” and the former “statist” or “nationalist” (Emanuel, 2012). This 
division can be moved further in or further out: for instance, some theories may give special 
weight to fellow members of one’s state or city, or to larger collectivities than the nation-state. 
Geographical scope has clear implications for public health choices: some interventions, such as 
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vaccinations against communicable diseases, produce great benefits outside a nation’s borders, 
while others have much more local effects.  
Other distinctions of scope are also debated. There are, for instance, questions of 
temporal scope (Rawls, 1999, Parfit, 1984): what weight should justice give to the interests of 
those in the far future or distant past? There are even questions of biological scope (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka, 2013): what weight should be given to the interests of nonhuman animals or of 
ecosystems? These other forms of scope also bear on public health decisionmaking. For instance, 
how we evaluate changes in the design of the built environment that affect carbon emissions will 
depend on what duties we owe to future generations. Likewise, evaluating the burdens that 
disease eradication may impose on nonhuman animals who are carriers of disease will implicate 
questions of biological scope.  
WHAT CONDUCT DOES JUSTICE EVALUATE? THE SITE OF JUSTICE 
 
Discussions of the scope of justice try to identify the physical or conceptual spaces where 
justice applies. In contrast, debates regarding the site of justice try to identify the actions or 
interactions that are properly assessed by the standards of justice. 
One prominent view on the site of justice, associated with Rawls (1999) and Thomas 
Nagel (1991), regards distributive justice as applicable to the “basic structure” of society, which 
comprises institutions such as the constitution or other fundamental legal rules that organize 
society as well as the economy, property, and general rules passed by the legislature. So, for 
example, justice would apply to decisions whether to impose a tax on unhealthy foods, because 
these taxes are implemented through binding legislative action. In contrast, distributive justice 
does not apply to a shopkeeper’s decision to sell a large sugary soda to an individual child, 
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because that decision is not part of the basic structure. While there may be good reasons to 
criticize the shopkeeper, those criticisms are grounded in morality rather than justice, or at least 
in forms of justice other than distributive justice.  
A different perspective on the site of justice is adopted by G.A. Cohen (1997), who 
frames it in terms of the feminist slogan “the personal is political.” On Cohen’s view, individual 
choices such as selling a sugary soda must also be evaluated in terms of justice. For Cohen, there 
is no clear distinction between rules of law, such as taxes or regulations, and individual choices, 
such as the shopkeeper’s choice to sell soda to the child: all are subject to the same form of 
evaluation. 
 Debates regarding the site of justice are relevant to the question of how broadly justice 
applies to public health, and which actors within public health systems should be concerned 
about justice. If Cohen’s view is correct, then Julie’s co-workers who provide direct public 
health services, such as nurses or epidemiologists in the field, should evaluate their choices in 
providing care or interviewing people by employing the same principles of justice that apply to 
structural and legislative decisions. In contrast, if justice applies only to the basic structure of 
society, then Julie and her colleagues still have reason to care about justice, but providers of 
direct services can be subject only to norms of professional ethics that are unrelated to, and may 
deviate from, principles of distributive justice. 
Last, many public health interventions—such as antismoking or safer sex campaigns—
attempt to shift social norms rather than creating or enforcing binding laws, which raises the 
question of whether social norms should be evaluated according to principles of justice 
(Ronzoni, 2008). Social norms are more than purely individual decisions, although norms can be 
reinforced or threatened by those decisions. However, they are not enforced by the use of 
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binding legal authority. Nonetheless, social norms can have a pervasive influence on how 
individuals’ lives go.  
WHO DECIDES? RESOLVING DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT JUSTICE 
 
The discussion so far illustrates that questions about justice are complex. This complexity 
produces ample room for disagreement. One place for disagreement concerns choices about how 
to understand justice: for instance, which constraints to recognize or which metric to use. 
Another concerns the resolution of conflicts between different aspects of justice, for instance, 
how to weigh constraints against distributive principles. As they try to decide which public 
health interventions should receive priority for funding and implementation, Julie and her 
colleagues may face both these types of disagreements. 
Disagreements about justice can be resolved in numerous ways. One way of doing so is 
democracy: each position is presented to the public, who select what they conclude is the best 
conception of justice. There are two major strands of democracy discussed by political 
philosophers, aggregative and deliberative. In aggregative democracy, individuals separately 
evaluate proposals and vote on them, and their votes are then aggregated to determine which 
proposal is selected. In deliberative democracy, by contrast, individuals gather together to 
discuss and debate the proposals under consideration, with their discussions constrained by 
certain procedural and substantive norms (Cohen, 2009; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). After 
the discussions, individuals either vote independently or reach some sort of communal 
consensus.   
Democracy has the advantage of giving each individual’s perspective equal weight, and 
of ensuring that political decisions are responsive to the public. It faces some challenges, 
 18 
however, in handling certain questions of justice. For instance, determining whose voice counts 
in democratic decisions requires settling the question of the scope of justice (Goodin, 2007), 
which makes it difficult to derive an account of the scope of justice from democracy alone. 
Additionally, if voters are confused or uninterested, they may reach outcomes that are 
substantively bad, and pure democracy may also reach outcomes that are bad for numerical 
minorities (Arneson, 2009). Last, real-world decisionmaking processes, even formally 
democratic ones, frequently give insufficient weight to the voices of poor or socially excluded 
groups (Young, 2000).  
In public health, democracy frequently plays a role in determining whether a given 
intervention is implemented or a given consideration is accepted as relevant to justice. For 
instance, votes about whether to tax sugary drinks or unhealthy foods frequently reflect 
judgments about the justice of such taxation. So do votes to permit regulation on guns in various 
states and municipalities. Norman Daniels and James Sabin (2002) suggest that an approach they 
term “Accountability for Reasonableness,” which has affinities with deliberative democracy, can 
be used to set priorities in a variety of health settings, including negotiations between 
governments and providers of health care services. 
Though some version of democracy is the most popular way of resolving disagreements, 
alternatives exist. One prominent alternative to democracy for resolving disagreements is to 
appeal to some foundational moral ideal. For instance, Nussbaum (2003) bases her list of 
capabilities not on democratic, collective judgments but on an Aristotelian account of what it 
means for a human being to flourish. Similarly, some utilitarians regard the importance of 
maximizing overall welfare as a foundational truth to which we can reason by simply reflecting 
on the nature of human rationality (de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Just as medicine’s emphasis on individual-level dilemmas connects it with individual 
morality and ethics, public health’s population-level emphasis inevitably connects it with 
political philosophy and with justice. Understanding the landscape of justice will enable actors 
within public health systems both to evaluate the merits of different public health choices and to 
compare public health interventions with interventions outside of public health.  
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